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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- EQUAL PROTECTION- FOURTH CIRCUIT
FINDS UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND MINORITY SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.- Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d I47 {4th Cir.

!994).

The use of minority scholarships to create a diverse student body
and to remedy past discrimination has been the subject of considerable
controversy in recent years. 1 Although such scholarships constitute a
small percentage of financial aid for higher education,2 opponents of
minority scholarships argue that they unfairly discriminate against
non-minority students on the basis of race. 3 In Podberesky v. Kirwan,4 the Fourth Circuit held that the University of Maryland at College Park (UMCP) denied Daniel Podberesky, a Hispanic/white
student, equal protection of the laws by excluding him from consideration for the race-based Benjamin Banneker Scholarship Program. The
program, the court held, was not narrowly tailored to remedy past discrimination at the University.5 In its analysis, however, the court applied only a portion of the applicable legal standard. A proper
analysis of the program using the factors set forth in United States v.
Paradise 6 would have demonstrated that the program was narrowly
tailored to address the racial problems of the University.
In the fall of I990, Daniel Podberesky applied for a Benjamin Banneker scholarship, a merit-based scholarship awarded to Mrican
American students at UMCP. The University did not consider him for
a scholarship, because he is not African American. Podberesky filed
suit in federal district court, challenging the Banneker program at
UMCP as a violation of Title VI and 42 U.S.C. §§ I98I and I983. 7
Based on a historical record that made it "abundantly clear that there
is a history of past discrimination at UMCP,"8 the district court
granted summary judgment to UMCP, because it found that there existed sufficient evidence of present effects of past discrimination to
1 See U.S. GEN. AcCOUNTING OFFICE, HIGHER EDUCATION: INFORMATION ON MINORITYTARGETED SCHOLARSHIPS I (I994).
2 See id.
3 See Mary Jordan, Minority Scholarship Rules Relaxed, WASH. PoST, Feb. IS, I994, at AI6.
4 38 F.3d I47 (4th Cir. I994).
5 See id. at I6I.
6 480 U.S. I49 (1987).
7 See Podberesky v. Kirwan, 764 F. Supp. 364, 366, 368 (D. Md. I99I); Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae at 3, Podberesky, 38 F.3d I47 (No. 93-2527). Because Title VI is coextensive with the Equal Protection Clause, see Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S.
582, 6Io-IX (I983) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment), the district court considered whether
the program denied Podberesky equal protection of the Jaws. The court ruled against Podberesky
on the §§ I98I and 1983 claims. See Podberesky, 764 F. Supp. at 376-778 Podberesky, 764 F. Supp. at 372.
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merit an affirmative action program and that the program was narrowly tailored to "serve[ ] the compelling interest of remedying" those
present effects. 9 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded
for findings of fact on the existence of present effects of past discrimination at UMCP. 10 On remand, the district court upheld the Banneker program as constitutional. 11 The district court found that a long
history of pervasive discrimination at the University12 resulted in four
present effects of discrimination: the University's poor reputation in
the Mrican American community, the present perception of a hostile
campus climate for Mrican American students, underrepresentation of
Mrican Americans in the student body, and a disproportionately high
attrition rate among Mrican American students. 13
A three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit reversed. 14 Judge Widener, writing for the panel, ruled that the district court erred in finding that "the University had sufficient evidence of present effects of
past discrimination to justify the program" and in finding that the program was narrowly tailored to achieve its objectives. 15 The court entered judgment in favor of Podberesky, because it found that the
program was not narrowly tailored to achieve its goals. 16 The Fourth
Circuit rejected the .district court's findings of four present effects of
past discrimination, concluding that they were either insufficient as a
matter of law or insufficiently demonstrated as a matter of fact. First,
the court stated that neither the University's poor reputation in the
Mrican American community nor the perception of racial hostility on
campus was "sufficient, standing alone, to justify the single-race Banneker Program."17 Judge Widener also rejected the district court's resolution of factual disputes concerning the underrepresentation and
high attrition rates of Mrican American students on summary
judgment. 18
The .court next found that even if it was "assumed that the University had demonstrated that blacks were underrepresented at the University and that the higher attrition rate was related to past
discrimination," the Banneker program was not narrowly tailored to
remedy these problems. 19 The court based this holding on four find9

Id. at 375.
See Podberesky v. Kirwan, 956 F.2d 52, 57 (4th Cir. 1992).
11 See Podberesky v. Kirwan, 838 F. Supp. 1075, 1099 (D. Md. 1993).
12 The court identified several manifestations of this pervasive discrimination. See id. at
1077-80.
13 See id. at 1084-94.
14 See Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, 151 (4th Cir. 1994). Judges Wilkins and Hamilton
joined in Judge Widener's opinion.
15 Id. at rs1.
16 See id. at r61.
17 Id. at IS4·
18 See id. at ISS-57·
19 Id. at IS7-S8.
10
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ings. First, because "[h]igh achievers, whether African-American or
not, are not the group against which the University discriminated in
the past,"20 the court rejected the argument that a program that attempted to attract "high achieving" blacks to UMCP was narrowly tailored.21 Second, because Banneker scholarships were awarded to nonMaryland residents, the program was not narrowly tailored to increase
the representation or decrease the attrition rate of "qualified McleanAmerican high school students in Maryland," which was the group the
University had identified as the relevant reference pool.22 Third, the
court criticized the district court for employing an arbitrary reference
pool to determine the extent of underrepresentation at UMCP. 23 Finally, the court found that the University had not shown that it had
attempted race-neutral solutions to remedy the lower retention rate of
black students. 24
The Fourth Circuit applied only a portion of the proper legal standard to the Banneker program to determine if the program was narrowly tailored. 25 Judge Widener analyzed the program according to
the factors that the Supreme Court reviewed in City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 26 but noted that the program could not withstand the

20 ld. at I58.
ld.
22 ld. at 159 (internal quotation marks omitted).
23 See id.
24 See id. at r6r.
25 The court also made several errors in its analysis of the program. The court's reasoning in
rejecting the hostile-climate justification - that many universities in the North and the South
could make similar claims - was a non sequitur. Judge Widener reasoned that such pervasive
discrimination is "societal discrimination, which cannot be used as a basis for supporting a raceconscious remedy." ld. at I55· However, if universities discriminate against African Americans,
their discrimination may be part of a larger pattern of societal discrimination. This possibility
neither lessens nor excuses the insidiousness of each individual university's past actions or the
present effects of that past discrimination such that affirmative action at the individual universities is unconstitutional. Furthermore, the Podberesky court's result is inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's prior decisions, including City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469
(1989). Although the Court has cautioned against programs ainied at remedying broad perceptions of societal discrimination, see, e.g., id. at 498-500, Croson clearly states that "[n]othing we
say today precludes a state or local entity from taking action to rectify the effects of identified
discrimination within its jurisdiction." ld. at 509 (emphasis added).
In addition, although the Podberesky court claimed that the program could not be narrowly
tailored because it was designed to attract "high achieving" African Americans, if the University
discriminated against African Americans, the fact that it did not single out "high achieving" African Americans for additional or heightened discrimination is irrelevant. As African Americans,
the "high-achievers" are members of the group against which the University discriminated previously, and as such, are entitled to the benefits of the University's remedial actions. The Supreme
Court has expressly rejected the idea that an affirmative action plan is invalid if it benefits those
who were not the identified victims of discrimination. See Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l
Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 445 (1986).
26 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
21
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test announced in United States v. ParadiseP In explaining why it
would consider only the factors discussed in Croson, and not those set
out in Paradise, the court emphasized two points. First, unlike the
fifty-percent promotional requirement at issue in Paradise, the Banneker scholarship did not require racial quotas. 28 Second, in contrast
to Paradise, both Croson and Podberesky dealt with claims involving
present effects of past discrimination. 29 However, Paradise did involve a racial quota to remedy the present effects of past discrimination.30 Furthermore, the Supreme Court did not revise or abandon the
Paradise standard in Croson; 31 rather, the Court limited itself to "two
observations" on the issue whether the promotional requirement was
narrowly tailored, because the plan in Croson was not connected to
"identified discrimination in any way."32 Therefore, the Supreme
Court did not conduct a full "narrowly tailored" analysis in Croson.
Such an analysis, the Court explained, would be "almost impossible,"
because the City of Richmond had failed to demonstrate discrimination and thus lacked a compelling interest to justify the program. 33
Thus, the Court's ultimate holding in Croson was based on a lack of a
compelling state interest;34 the "two observations" of the Court were
merely dicta.
To determine if the program was narrowly tailored, the Podberesky
court should have examined the factors announced in Paradise, which
encompass the factors analyzed in Croson. Under Paradise, a court
should consider "the necessity for the relief and the efficacy of alternative remedies; the flexibility and duration of the relief[;] . . . the relationship of the numerical goals to the relevant labor market; and the
impact of the relief on the rights of third parties" to determine if an
affirmative action program is narrowly tailored.35 Had the Podberesky
court properly applied Paradise, it would have held that the program
was narrowly tailored to remedy the present effects of past
discrimination.
The Banneker program was a necessary component of the University's efforts to remedy the present effects of past discrimination at
UMCP. Title VI regulations require a recipient of federal funding to
27 4So U.S. 149 (19S7); see Podberesky, 3S F.3d at ISS n.Io. The Fourth Circuit previously
applied the Paradise test in Hayes v. North State Law Enforcement Officers Ass'n, 10 F.3d 207,
216 (4th Cii. 1993).
28 See Podberesky, 3S F.3d at xss n.Io.
29 See id.
30 See Paradise, 480 U.S. at IS4-SS.
31 See Croson, 488 U.S. at so7.
32 Id.
33 Id. at sos-o7.
34 See id. at sos, S11.
35 Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171. Like the panel's opinion, this Recent Case assumes a statisti·
cally significant disparity exists and that the disparity is related to past discrimination. See
Podberesky, 3S F.3d at IS7-sS.
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"take affirmative action to overcome the effects of prior discrimination."36 The University's history of discrimination and segregation created barriers to the creation of a fully integrated system of higher
education.37 Prior to the program's institution, the state had made repeated attempts to comply with Title VI. The final plan that was approved by the Office of Civil Rights "included specific reliance on the
... Banneker Scholarship Program. "38 Without such a program, many
minorities may have been unwilling or financially unable to attend the
University. 39 The Banneker program addressed these barriers at
UMCP.40
Moreover, race-neutral remedies would neither have effectively addressed the present effects of past discrimination at UMCP nor substantially furthered the University's diversity goals. The University's
attempts at both a race-blind merit-based scholarship program and a
race-neutral need-based scholarship program had already failed to recruit black students in significant numbers. 41 Additionally, race-neutral efforts would not have ad<l:ressed several factors that deterred
black students from attending UMCP, including the perception of racial hostility and the poor reputation of the University within Mrican
American communities. Furthermore, alternative remedies would not
have effectively furthered the University's diversity goals. 42 Although
racial diversity is only one aspect of creating a diverse student body,
"it would be impossible to arrange an affirmative-action program in a
racially neutral way and have it successful. "43
In addition, the Banneker program was flexible and of limited duration. It was reevaluated at least every three years,44 which ensured
that its minimal burden would be imposed only so long as it was necessary to mitigate persisting problems. This periodic reevaluation increased the program's flexibility, because it allowed administrators to
alter or eliminate the program if it proved no longer necessary.
The University also established the proper relationship between the
Banneker program's goals and the relevant student population. The
program's goals must have been designed to address the under36 34 C.F.R § 100.3(b){6)(i) (1994). The regulations also permit universities to undertake voluntary affirmative action programs to overcome the continuing effects of factors that contributed
to the underrepresentation of minority groups. See id. § 100.3(b)(6)(ii).
37 See Podberesky v. Kirwan, 838 F. Supp. 1075. 1084-94 oi Md. 1993).
38 Id. at 1081.
39 Several university officials have commented that a university may have difficulty recruiting
minority students without financial aid specifically designated for such students. See Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs, 59 Fed. Reg. 8756, 8761 (1994).
40 See Podberesky, 838 F. Supp. at 1094.
4l See id. at 1095. ·
42 The Supreme Court recognized the importance of a diverse student body in Regents of the
Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 3II-12 (1978).
43 Id. at 407 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
44 See Podberesky, 838 F. Supp. at 1082.
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representation and attrition rates of black students, rather than an alternative racial disparity.45 The program was so designed - among
other things, it attempted to attract more African Americans to UMCP
and to reduce the attrition rate of those Mrican Americans who had
chosen to attend the University. 46 To remedy these problems, the University provided Banneker scholarships to twenty to thirty black students in each entering class of approximately 3100 total students less than one percent of the entering class.47 This relationship was
analogous to similar relationships that have been approved as constitutionally permissible.48 The provision of Banneker scholarships was directly related to remedying the proper disparities.
Finally, the program imposed a minimal burden upon third parties.49 The program was not administered "to affirmatively admit African-American students solely on the basis of race.nso Rather,
Banneker scholarships were presented after admissions decisions had
been completed, and therefore, did not affect the admission of any student- Mrican American or otherwise.51 Furthermore, the funds for
the Banneker Scholarship program represented just one percent of the
University's total financial aid budget;52 therefore, all students competed for the overwhelming majority of University financial aid.
As opposition to affirmative action continues to grow, the Fourth
Circuit, among others, would overlook the pervasive effects of past
discrimination. However, the effects of centuries of economic and educational deprivation continue to disadvantage many blacks who attempt to pursue economic and educational opportunities. The
elimination of race-conscious means today will only exacerbate the
deep chasms that presently exist between the races. 53
45 Compare United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, r7g-8o (1987) (upholding a promotional
requirement, in part because the requirement's minority representation goal reflected the percentage of blacks in the applicable labor market) with Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,
294 (r986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (explaining that the
school board's minority representation goal for teachers was impermissibly tied to "the percentage
of minority students in the school district," rather than "the percentage of qualified minority
teachers within the relevant labor pool").
46 See Podberesky, 838 F. Supp. at ro87-89, 109I.
47 See id. at ro96.
48 See, e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 86r F. Supp. 551, 575 (W.D. Tex. 1994) (explaining that the
proper relationship was "easily satisfied" by the University of Texas School of Law's admissions
goals, which were based on the "percentages of black and Mexican American college graduates in
the State of Texas").
49 The Supreme Court has recogni2ed that remedying this country's history of discrimination
may require innocent parties to bear some of the burden. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 28o-8r.
50 Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147, r6o (4th Cir. 1994).
51 See Podberesky, 838 F. Supp. at 1096.
52 See id. at ro77.
53 See, e.g., CORNEL WEST, RACE MATIERS 95 (1994) ("Given the history of this country, it is
a virtual certainty that without affirmative action, racial and sexual discrimination would return
with a vengeance.").

